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REEL 5 (TAFK)

- 1 D -

42

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DULLES:

-----tremendous background of knowledge. Both of them were briefed by the C.I.A. in that election and in the election in '36 and interesting enough, in 1948 election the candidates being the President---President and Governor Dewey, I was working with Governor Dewey as---as---toward the end at least, as his senior---sort of advisor in the foreign policy field. My brother at that time was over with General Marshall at the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly which that year took place in Paris; So I've looked at it from various angles and then Tom Dewey has often talked to me about the problem that he had during the 1944 elections, when some highly classified information began to leak out and it was a question of whether or not he would use it and the President sent a messenger to him advising him of the classified nature of the information and he didn't use it.

BEVAREID:

Yes, he said that publicly later.

DULLES:

I think he gave that---I think that's in the public domain

- 2 B -

REEL

BACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN CPYRGHT

MULLER CONTINUED:

I wouldn't have mentioned it to you, if it hadn't been what's the best way of doing it? The candidate doesn't have time to give to trying to acquaint himself with all the multitude of problems in the foreign field, particularly as they are today and he is given briefing as he requests them, with the added proviso that if there is a new situation that comes to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency during a campaign, that we feel that the Director of Central Intelligence feels should come to the attention of the candidate. That would be---briefing would be given on that point, so that there wouldn't be a surprise.

SEVAREID:

Do you do that just orally?

MULLER:

Well, we have a meeting. Yes, it's done orally---it's done orally. Generally, the briefing officer, whether it was the Director, or one of his top assistants, would take with him to these briefings, a black book with items, LAGS, GUNS, BERLIN, MISSILES and so forth and so

- 3 D -

REEL.

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~~DULLES CONTINUED:~~

on, so you would have a briefing paper on each one of these subjects which you could refer to if any question came up. You couldn't answer just from---just from memory.

SEVAREID:

No stenographic report?

DULLES:

No stenographic reports, no.

SEVAREID:

And you think this should be changed?

DULLES:

It's been generally my practice to---to make a brief report of the general subjects treated to the---to the President, so he would know in general what---what the candidate had been briefed on, so if he thought anything else should be added, he'd have an opportunity to add or to make cuts.

SEVAREID:

Would it be better to have all that done in writing so both the intelligence officer and the candidate could later protect themselves in case of controversy

- 4 B -

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DULLES:

Well, I've been thinking about that and I think some study should be given to a---a new procedure, so that both the candidate and the---his opponent---whether incumbent or not, would have some protection really, to maybe give a written briefing on various issues, with the candidate, if he wanted, to ask for additions to that---would be a better system, leaving the candidate free also, as he should be free, to address himself, as the case might be, either to the President, or the Secretary of State, or to the Director of Central Intelligence, for more information on a particular subject if he felt that it was essential to the proper conduct of a---of the campaign, so we got it both ways and I think that the---in view of the time element---in view of the importance of---of having a record, it might be worth considering. I haven't talked this thing through since this recent matter. I've been thinking it over a great deal. I remember that when I was working with Governor Dewey in '48, we had a lot of very delicate problems. The---the question of Palestine---Israel was

- 5 D -

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~~DULLES CONTINUED:~~

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very acute at that time and it became naturally, an issue in the campaign and there were a lot of problems in regard to that---that came up and at that time, it was the State Department would keep me advised at President Truman's request---would keep me advised by telephone, or by telegram, of important developments. K..... jumped out of the---the window in the consulate in the Russian office in New York/during the campaign and that became quite an issue and we had a good many matters. The Berlin blockade---those issues were up at that time

over

Eric, I've been thinking/a good deal since the debate ---since the issue came up over the last briefings, whether there wasn't a better way to handle this in the future, so as to avoid misunderstanding. I'd be inclined to think maybe that there is---maybe if, as you indicate maybe if the State Department, or the Central Intelligence Agency gave written briefings on important issues and the candidate, if he wished, could ask for supplementary material, or the candidate, if he felt uncertain about

- 6 D -

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BULLER CONTINUED:

a particular situation---he could make an inquiry, so that the record could be clear as to what the candidate knew, on what he'd been briefed and there wouldn't be the problem that's arisen recently.

SEVANKID:

Sir, you are a very gregarious man and you get about Washington socially a good deal in all my years here. I've never heard anybody accuse you of ever betraying any secret at any social gathering, but how do you self-censor yourself? How do you know when you're talking with people what is on the public record, what you've got privately, what is very secret---how does this operate on your mind? What sort of a brake works with you?

WILLIAMS:

Well, maybe only because I've been in this business for a long period of years. I can't tell sometimes. I go out and I'm asked a question and I answer it and I say to myself, "Look here, where did you get the information?" I say to myself, "Did you get that out of a secret tel-

- 7 D -

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BACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

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DULLES CONTINUES:

or did you read it in a newspaper, or hear it over a particular radio?" It's hard to do it.

SEVAREID:

Have you ever gone home from a dinner party thinking that you had said something---

DULLES:

Yes, I have.

SEVAREID:

---that you should not?

DULLES:

I have. While I'm gregarious, may I say I think that the cocktail party is a menace to civilization and to intelligence and I hope that some other method of social entertainment will be found in Washington to replace it.

SEVAREID:

A menace to the nervous system too?

DULLES:

And bad for the stomach. [LAUGHTER] And to other organs.

- 6 D -

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SEVANKID:

Do you ever talk in your sleep, Mr. Dulles?

DULLES:

Not that I know of.

SEVANKID:

I think, Mr. Dulles, when you were given the National Security Medal by President Kennedy, he said that "The C.I.A. and its Director could not talk about his victory but had to suffer in silence over his defeats which did become known." Is this always been the problem?

DULLES:

Its always been the case. Always will be the case and I think that when you go into a certain line of activity in a certain profession, you've got to know the problems that's one that you have to live with and it's one of the hard ones. I think one of the characteristics in of Americans is we like to talk. We like to talk about what we're doing. We like to talk what we have accomplished. Well, in the intelligence business, you just can't do that.

- 9 D -

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, you have the continuing job, or you had when you ran C.I.A., of letting the President of this country know where we stand in terms of power, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union particularly. If you can sum it up at all, where do we stand?

DULLES:

I think we stand all right. I think we've got the economic power. I think we've got the military power to meet an attack and to win a war, if it should be imposed on us. I don't---I'm not a pessimist. I don't think we can relax, but---nor do I think that we can be licked.

SEVAREID:

I gather you're an optimist in two senses here. One, in feeling a big war will not come and two, that if it should come, we would survive it?

DULLES:

Correct.

SEVAREID:

Have there been victories that you can mention that we haven't known about?

- 10 D -

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DULLES:

No---no---no. I'm not going to mention that.

SEVAREID:

What would you say was your greatest defeat and what was your greatest achievement? Could that be answered?

DULLES:

No, that really couldn't be answered.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, can you tell us what you consider---looking back over the years, your principal achievement with C.I.A. and your principal defeat?

DULLES:

No Eric, I couldn't do that without sort of violating the---the principles under we operate. We don't talk about our successes and we have to let other people talk about our defeats without being able really to counterattack.. I did mention, I think---I did mention, I think earlier, that I would ^{not} deny that we had something to do with the finding and publishing the true text of Khrushchev's famous speech in 1956, which was extremely

- 11 D -

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DULLES CONTINUED:

useful, I think, to the free world in that it showed up what had happened under Communism and under Stalin and it---it raised a perfect furor in all the Communist through---throughout the world. This may be a slight exception to the rule, but since Khrushchev in a speech has alluded to this, I'm probably not breaking any secret.

SEVAREID:

Could you make any estimate as to how many covert people the Russians may have inside our country?

DULLES:

No, you have to ask that question to Mr. Hoover. That's his job. I doubt whether he could tell.

SEVAREID:

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, a couple of years ago, we were all told that there was a great missile lag between us and the Russians that they were ahead. Now, we're told there is no missile lag, that they are not ahead in missiles. How does one explain this?

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DULLES:

I've seen some of those suggestions. In fact, I think that a very distinguished man has suggested with a wave of a wand, in some way, I had eliminated a missile lag, or a lag on our bomber strength as compared with the Soviet Union. First of all, I want to make it clear that in the Central Intelligence Agency, it had not been our practice when I was there, to make what we call net estimates. We're not experts in where the United States stands in missiles, or bombers, or so forth. That [BUZZER] is the Department of Defense and so if you want to get what you call a net estimate, you have to put two and two together. The intelligence that the Central Intelligence may have and other agencies particularly military services, and the information as to our own position. However, I can say this. We have a very difficult problem in dealing with the Soviet position in any type of military hardware and we often are requested, as is quite normal, by the Defense Department, to---the C.I.A. is requested to make estimates as to the future. They have to plan ahead. If we're

- 130

REEL

MACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

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DULLES CONTINUED

planning any missile systems, it takes four, five, or six years from the time of the blueprints to the time the---the missile, whatever it may be, or the aircraft is in operation. We've just seen that in the B-70 debate, so that the---in the past we've made these estimates and let's take an example. The same thing applied to missiles, but it was a little clearer in the bomber situation. We obtain certain intelligence, or intelligence was obtained by the intelligence community that the Soviet Union was constructing "X". I'm not going to give you numbers. I'll just give you figures---- I'll just give you a letter. "X" number of heavy bombers and we get a request to project how many heavy bombers that the Soviet Union will have in---five years from that date, so you take "X"---the number per month and multiply it by sixty, which is the number of months and you say, subject to depreciation, to accident and so forth, they'll probably have this number of bombers at the end of the line. Well, what happens? Just as with us, they go along for a while. They find the particular weapon---say a

- 14 0

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heavy bomber, isn't quite what they thought it was. They probably find that we had prepared defenses against it. They were greater than they expected. And they decide to change and they decide not to build "X" of these particular bombers per month, but "X" minus "Y". Well then, the figures you've given for the future are all wrong and you change them and so the gap that might have well existed at that future date disappears--- disappears not because anybody's used a wand, but because the Soviet have done what we do. They've changed their minds. They've decided not to build a certain weapon and have gone to another weapon and somewhat the same thing happened in---in missiles, but not for the same reason. In the field of missiles, just as we have, they are changing from their first generation missile to a second and maybe a third and a fourth generation missile. We have various generations of missiles and therefore, when you move from one to another between the numbers---may go down during the period/your movement from the first to the second generation, until the second generation is in effect.

- 13 D

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SEVAREID:

What I get from this sir, is that you're saying it is meaningless to talk about our being ahead, or their being ahead in missiles at any given time.

DULLES:

We're both moving along rapidly.

(CUT)

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, can a great power like this expect to exercise world responsibility and make tough decisions and still be loved or even popular?

DULLES:

The British Empire thought they had done that Eric, during the Nineteenth Century and if you'll recall at the time of the Boer War, when they had some reverses in South Africa, to their great astonishment, they found all their---what they thought were their great friends in the European continent---were gloating and perfectly delighted at what had happened to the great big power that had done so much during that century. I don't think

- 16 D

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DULLES CONTINUED:

it ought to be the objective of a country to be loved. I think our objective should be to be respected. Now, we can't please everybody. We found that in the whole colonial issue. We have to do what we think is right. We have to be firm. We have to be courageous. We have to be willing to do things that we know won't be universally liked, but which we feel are in the interest of the United States and the free world and I hope that will be our objective, rather than to---to be liked, or loved.

SEVAREID:

Sir, in this whole business, vis-a-vis---

DULLES:

By the way, may I interrupt you? And may I just bring back from my experience one little point? I was in Paris when Woodrow Wilson arrived. I think I mentioned that to you. He received, when he arrived in Paris for the peace conference in 1918---I think about the middle of December---a reception from the French that was absolute unparalleled for any foreigner and then he made trips

- 17 0

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MACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

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DULLES CONTINUED:

around Europe. He went eventually to England, to Belgium to Italy and he received the most uproarious and--- reception in Italy and the feeling there was almost stronger than anywhere else, because now Italy was going to have new frontiers, new growths, rejoin with other Italians and so forth and so on. During the days of the peace conference, the top issue of who would have Fiume. Remember, *D'Annunzio* went there and there was a terrific to-do of the whole Italian people felt they should have Fiume..... and Woodrow Wilson, I think very wisely decided that Italy, with all the ports that it had---I mean, the one thing Italy's got is a ports and Yugoslavia had practically no access to the sea and if you took away Fiume from it, it wouldn't have an access to sea, so he decided and it was really his decision, that Fiume should not be Italian. Overnight, the great popularity he had, the man of self-determination that was uniting people and so forth and so on---vanish and I have still in my files---I have little pieces of paper that resemble paper that one doesn't mention over

- 10 D -

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MACK GDD, ROSSI EVEN

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DULLES CONTINUED:

the radio, with Wilson in a German helmet, his face on these pieces of paper and they were scattered all over Italy, so that shows you what popularity is in the international field. You have to do your duty sometime and sometimes it's very tough.

SEVANKID:

What can the average American do in terms of his duty, or his contribution in this whole world conflict we're

DULLES:

That's one of the toughest questions you put to answer and I would need a long time to try to answer that and I've been thinking it over a great deal, because I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the citizens of other countries who are told, "Meet this great menace. You must do something to meet this menace," and yet the ordinary man, the man in the street, the man and woman. He doesn't know how he can contribute. He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace, "Our society is menaced by Communism, but what's he to do and that has resulted in certain aberrations that

12 12

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DULLES CONTINUED:

don't need to define, because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will probably know what I have in mind, to these aberrations and I think a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are doing, they get led astray by this. Well now, there's certain things one can do. The first place, we ought to learn what we can about it, so we understand it. We have the problem, here in this country and we have the country in any areas overseas where we have any responsibilities jointly with our allies, as in Berlin, to see that that remains a showcase of Democracy. We have a lot of things here in this country so that we remain a showcase of Democracy. Many of these things we have to leave to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, in outlining our policies. There is no easy answer as to what the individual can do, but each individual can, to some extent, contribute. There are many---there are many worthy causes. We are trying and many ways, of course, to get the message across to the world. There's Radio Free Europe. There's Radio

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DULLES CONTINUED:

Liberty and there's E.I.A.S., and there's the Voice of America. The support that is given to efforts of that kind and we all, on these issues, we all rally together in support of the actions our government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they may be threatened by Communism and the positions of the free world, whether it's Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may be. That's about the best I can do on that very difficult question.

SEVANKID:

Could one describe the desired individual posture this way---be informed and as the late Elmer Davis said, "Don't let them scare you."

DULLES:

That's very good. [LAUGHTER] It's a good thing to end that question off.

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Well, it's more of an external threat than it is an internal threat, at the present time. It's an external threat in the sense it's a threat to those whose position in the free world is important for us.

- 21 D -

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, is there any way you can strike a balance sheet as to how we stand with the Russians?

DULLES:

I think if we take a period of time. Yes, let's take, as a decade, or a little more than a decade---the last decade or fifteen years. One can---one can strike a balance sheet and it's not, from angle---it's not a bad balance sheet. Look at territorial changes. There was a defeat in Northern Vietnam and Northern Vietnam became Communist. On the other hand, Austria is now totally free and totally united, when at one time there was a large zone of occupation of the Communists. We have suffered reverses in the Caribbean and in Cuba, there's no question about that, over this period. On the other hand, looking at other territorial questions, the Soviet Union and the Communist world has shown us that this world is not a monolithic unity of purpose and as I think I have said, that I think is probably one of the most serious losses that the Communist world has suffered over this---over this period. There are those who preach

- 22 D -

REEL

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BULLIES CONTINUED

"All you need to do to have peace in the world is to have a Communist world." Well, is that true? Look what's going on between Soviet Union and China today. Look at little Albania that once was under Moscow and now has---I grant you---it's a different form and I don't say it's a better form of Communism, but at least there's a descent there and Moscow has been forced to withdraw its forces and its representatives from Albania. We have before, the Yugoslav situation. It was more a case where the Marxists Yugoslavs were---initially at least were rather invited out and you take in the Congo, where they started out with a program which made us feel that this is going to be one of the great targets and they had to withdraw and other places around the world that one can mention which show us that just as we cannot claim as I hope we will be able to claim, complete unity in the free world, there is no unity in the Communist world and Communism does not bring the unity and peace that has become of the great slogans of the Communist leaders, particularly Khrushchev.

- 23 D -

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SEVAREID:

How does the average American help to make this balance sheet look even better for us?

DULLES:

How can he, or how does he?

SEVAREID:

How can he?

DULLES:

That is not an easy question to answer. He can do it by understand the danger and the problems our government faces in meeting it and that requires, I think, more education. I think there ought to be more education in our---our secondary schools, as well as in our colleges. He can do it by understanding that our [BUZZER] great strength is showing that our system, our free system is more efficient and more effective than the Communist system. The reason why they want us out of Berlin is because they can't tolerate, or don't feel they can tolerate the showplace that West Berlin is, of freedom, of progress, industrial, social, spiritual, as against what is all around Berlin in the Communist world. He

- 24 B -

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DULLES CONTINUED:

can do that elsewhere in the world, or help that come about elsewhere in the world. I think we can show that the association of free men can do more than the association of slave men and maybe everybody can have some part in that.

SEVANKID:

Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of your recipe for the average American? Be informed. Believe in your country and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."

DULLES:

I'd like to leave it at that.

+++++LISTENING SIEVE+++++

END OF REEL 3(TAPE)